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NEONATICIDE AND THE MISUSE OF THE INSANITY
DEFENSE
On December 17, 1990, around 6 a.m., 20-year-old Stephanie
Wernick was in her dormitory bathroom.' Jeannette, a girl on
Wernick's dorm floor, entered the bathroom and Wernick asked her
for a tampon. Ten minutes later Jeannette returned to the
bathroom and Wernick told Jeannette she was having a heavy
period and asked her for a sanitary napkin. About twenty minutes
later, Jeannette and her friend Laura were in the hallway outside
the bathroom when they heard what they thought was a baby's cry
coming from inside the bathroom. The girls rushed into the
bathroom and underneath the stall door, saw a pool of blood at
Wernick's feet. In a calm voice, Wernick told the girls, "I'm fine, I'm
fine. Everything is okay."
Concerned, the girls ran to Wernick's room and woke her
roommate, Jody, and explained what they had seen. Jody went to
the bathroom to check on Wernick. Wernick told Jody that she was
fine and just was having a heavy period. Jody returned to the
bedroom.
A maid then entered the bathroom, saw the blood, and asked
Wernick if she was alright. Wernick gave the same response-she
was okay, she just was having a heavy period. Jody returned to the
bathroom with a towel, soap, and a sanitary napkin. Wernick told
Jody she was going to take a shower and asked her to set the items
by the sink. As Jody started to leave the bathroom, Wernick said,
"Oh, can you throw out my clothes? They're all bloody. They're in
that white plastic bag on the floor outside." Jody took the bag,
which she later recalled felt heavy, down the hall to the garbage
room.
Jody and Wernick both returned to their room and went back
to sleep. A little while later, another custodian found the garbage
bag Jody had thrown out and discovered a dead baby boy in the bag.
The custodian called the paramedics; however, they were not able
to revive the baby. While trying to administer CPR, the paramedics
found seven wads of toilet paper lodged in the baby's throat. The
police questioned Wernick about the murder and she denied any
knowledge of the baby. As Wernick was being brought to the
hospital that morning, however, she confessed to giving birth to the
little boy.
1. The facts of the following story are from BARBARA K KIRWIN, THE MAD, THE BAD, AND
THE INNOCENT: THE CRIMINAL MIND ON TRIAL 65-95 (1997); see also People v. Wernick, 632
N.Y.S.2d 839, 840 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
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NEONATICIDE
Infanticide is the act of a parent killing her child.' Neonaticide
is the term used to describe the act of a parent killing her baby
within twenty-four hours of giving birth to the baby, whereas
filicide refers to a parent killing her child after the first twenty-four
hours.3 Experts distinguish between neonaticide and filicide
because the nature and circumstances of the crimes, the mental
states of the mothers, and the motivations for the killings vary
markedly between the two time frames. The focus of this Note is
specifically on neonaticide.
Number of Neonaticides Committed
Estimates vary, but mothers commit between 150 and 300
neonaticides each year in the United States.4 These figures,
however, do not include the number of undiscovered neonaticides.
Neonaticide cases could go undiscovered either because the death
is inaccurately determined to be accidental or because the mother
is able to conceal completely the birth and killing of the baby.
The number of neonaticides committed each year has increased
steadily.5 Regardless of the exact number of neonaticides commit-
ted each year, the coverage these crimes receive in the media
reflects society's varied reactions to such crimes. Reactions range
from shock, to anger, to sympathy for the mothers. This Note,
through an examination of the insanity defense, explores possible
reasons for these killings.
2. See Phillip J. Resnick, Murder of the Newborn: A Psychiatric Review of Neonaticide,
126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1414, 1415 (1970). Infanticide can be committed by either parent,
however, the emphasis of this Note is on killings committed by the mother.
3. See id. at 1414.
4. See Linda Chavez, When Compassion for Baby Killers Runs Deep, BALTIMORE SUN,
July 15, 1998 (Evening Ed.), at 15A; Interview by Vicky Que with Drs. Neal Kaye and
Margaret Spinelly, All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, July 9, 1998).
5. See Michael Weissenstein, Are Killings of Newborns on Rise? Experts Divided on
Touchy Topic, CoNTRA CosTA TIMES, Nov. 30, 1997, at A13. This finding is disputed by some.
For example, the Department of Justice has found that the number of neonaticides is
currently decreasing. See id.
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Who Commits Neonaticide
Only a few studies have been conducted on neonaticide, and
usually only as a smaller subgroup of a study on infanticides.6
These studies compiled some of the general characteristics of the
mothers. The mothers are typically under twenty-five, single, and
free from any form of psychiatric illness.7
The leading study on neonaticide, published in 1970, was
conducted by Phillip J. Resnick.' Resnick distinguished
neonaticides from all other forms of infanticides based on the
characteristics and motivations of the murdering mothers.9
Another study, conducted by P.T. d'Orban, examined eleven
neonaticides cases and compared those cases to a larger group of
infanticide cases.'0 D'Orban found that all of the neonaticide
mothers were single, the neonaticide mothers were the youngest
group, with a mean age of twenty-one, and only one of ten
neonaticide mothers had previously suffered from a psychiatric
illness." That same study found that "neonaticides scored lowest
on indices of family, social and psychiatric disturbance." 2
The characteristics of neonaticide mothers differ greatly from
the filicide mothers who kill their children after the first twenty-
four hours. Resnick found that in contrast to the neonaticide
mothers, the majority of filicide mothers were over twenty-five,
married, psychotic, and suffering from serious depression. 3
6. See generally P.T. d'Orban, Women Who Kill their Children, 134 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY.
560 (1979); C.M. Green & S.V. Manohar, Neonaticide and Hysterical Denial of Pregnancy,
156 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 121 (1990); M. Logan, Mothers Who Murder, 28 CANADIAN Soc.
FORENSIC Sci. J. 201 (1995); M.N. Marks & R. Kumar, Infanticide in England and Wales, 33
MED. Sci. L. 329 (1993); Mauro V. Mendlowicz et al., Case-Control Study on the Socio-
Demographic Characteristics of 53 Neonaticidal Mothers, 21 INTVL. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 209
(1998); Resnick, supra note 2; Edward Saunders, Neonaticides Following "Secret"
Pregnancies, 104 PUB. HEALTH REP. 368 (1989).
7. See d'Orban, supra note 6, at 570 (summarizing the findings of a study conducted of
infanticide mothers); Resnick, supra note 2, at 1414 (analyzing neonaticide mothers as
distinct from filicide mothers); Rachel Simon, Fear of Shame Carries Far Too High a Price
in the Grossberg Case, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, July 24, 1998, at A29 (describing the case
of Amy Grossberg, a teenage mother who killed her baby with the help of her boyfriend).
8. See Resnick, supra note 2, at 1414.
9. See id. at 1415. Resnick found that 89% of the neonaticide mothers were under
twenty-five, 81% were single, 17% were psychotic, and only 8% suffered from serious
depression. See id.
10. See d'Orban, supra note 6, at 565.
11. See id. at 570.
12. Id.
13. See Resnick, supra note 2, at 1414. Resnick found that only 23% of the filicide
mothers were twenty-five or younger, only 12% were single, 66% were psychotic, and 71%
were suffering from serious depression. See id.
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Manner of Death
The neonaticide deaths are generally violent, resulting from
some aggressive act by the mother, rather than by passive neglect
or abandonment. 4 The most common methods of neonaticide, after
suffocation, are "strangulation, head trauma, drowning, exposure,
and stabbing." 5 One study found that in five of the seven cases
studied, death resulted from drowning or exposure."6 D'Orban
found that in all the neonaticide cases studied, the mothers made
some attempt to conceal the death."
Motivation
Studies indicate the main reason neonaticide mothers kill their
babies is not because the mothers are psychotic, but simply because
the children are unwanted and the mother wants to avoid the
shame of giving birth to her child.'" Neonaticide is not a new crime,
but in the past, particularly in lesser developed countries, the
motivation was often economic."9 Today, however, poverty does not
appear to be a major factor.20 Rather, shame and desperation
appear to be the main motivations for the killings.2'
Two types of neonaticide mothers have been identified: (1)
immature mothers, and (2) strong-minded mothers. The most
common type "consists of sexually and emotionally immature
women, under strong social or parental pressure against an
illegitimate child, who make no premeditated plans to kill the
infant but panic following birth."22 The second, less common, profile
14. See d'Orban, supra note 6, at 565. Further, Resnick found that the "need to stifle the
baby's first cry makes suffocation the method of choice for mothers attempting to avoid
detection." Resnick, supra note 2, at 1415.
15. Resnick, supra note 2, at 1415.
16. See Saunders, supra note 6, at 368 (study of seven neonaticides committed in Iowa
during a 14-month period).
17. See d'Orban, supra note 6, at 565.
18. See d'Orban, supra note 6, at 570; Logan, supra note 6, at 248; Mendlowicz et al.,
supra note 6, at 217; Resnick, supra note 2, at 1414; Faye Bowers, Behind the Tragedy of
Discarded Babies, CHRISTIAN Sci. MoNrroR, June 18, 1997, at 27; Jonathan Gaw, Tragic Tale
of Killing of a Newborn Infant Hearing, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1992, at B1; Simon, supra note
7, at A29; Michael Weissenstein, When Babies Die Tragically, FoRT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM,
Nov. 17, 1997, at BI; Que, supra note 4, at 15A.
19. See Bowers, supra note 18, at 37.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Green & Manohar, supra note 6, at 125 (describing the characteristics of neonaticide
mothers).
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of neonaticide mothers is of "strong-minded women who plan the
death of the baby before it is born, with little moral concern for
their actions."23
D'Orban found that "neonaticide is committed predominantly
by young women of immature personality who do not suffer from
psychiatric illness; they kill their newborn children for social
reasons, usually in order to avoid the stigma of illegitimate child-
birth."24 Another study which examined neonaticide cases in Brazil
found that in almost all of the cases, the victims were illegitimate
children.25 That study also found that shame seems to be a primary
factor, motivating women to conceal their pregnancies and kill their
newborns.26
Mothers who kill their newborns generally are trying to protect
their own interests, "which range from avoiding the stigma of
having a child out of wedlock or from an extramarital affair to
economic reasons."27 Mothers who kill their older children are
mostly psychotic, but most neonaticide mothers kill their babies
simply because the child is not wanted.28 More often, married
neonaticide mothers kill their newborns to avoid detection of
extramarital paternity,29 whereas unmarried mothers are generally
first-time mothers attempting to avoid the stigma of having an
illegitimate child. 30 These first-time mothers "often deny that they
are pregnant or assume that the child will be stillborn."31 In many
cases, the mother makes no advance preparation for the care or
killing of the baby, but "[w]hen reality is thrust upon [her] by the
infant's first cry, [she] respond[s] by permanently silencing the
intruder."32 From the studies of neonaticide mothers, it appears
that many of the neonaticide mothers are young, single, first-time
mothers who feel they cannot tell their parents about their
23. Id.
24. D'Orban, supra note 6, at 570.
25. See Mendlowicz et al., supra note 6, at 216 (reporting that in fifty-one of the fifty-
three cases, the victims were illegitimate children).
26. See id. ("Shame associated with illegitimacy may play an important role in forcing
women to try to conceal their pregnancies even at the cost of killing the newborn child.").
27. Gaw, supra note 18 (quoting Resnick).
28. See Weissenstein, supra note 18; see also Resnick, supra note 2, at 1414-15 (finding
that when comparing neonaticides with filicides the "unwanted child" motivation constituted
83% of neonaticides, but only 11% of filicides).
29. See Resnick, supra note 2, at 1415.
30. See id. at 1416.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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pregnancies33 and who kill their babies rather than face the
responsibility of revealing the birth and caring for the child.
History of Neonaticide
Neonaticide is not new. "Among non-Christian peoples (with
the exception of the Jews) infanticide has from time immemorial
been the accepted procedure for disposing not only of deformed or
sickly infants, but of all such newborns as might strain the
resources of the individual family or the larger community."34
Times have changed, however. Unmarried mothers are no longer
chased out of town upon revealing their pregnancies. 35 Today,
women have options available to them at all stages of the preg-
nancy: contraception prior to conception; abortion following
conception; and adoption or other support services following the
birth. With all of these options available, why are women today
still murdering their newborns? Certainly unwanted births still
occur and it will always be difficult for an unmarried, pregnant
teenager to tell her parents she is pregnant and face the stigma of
an illegitimate birth. Are these factors enough to cause these
women to commit murder? Must these women be insane to commit
such a crime?
This Note examines how the insanity defense is being misused
as a means of giving a lesser, or no, sentence to neonaticide
mothers. This misuse of the insanity defense harms the criminal
justice system by allowing sane, guilty defendants to go free. In
33. See Simon, supra note 7.
34. William L. Langer, Infanticide: A Historical Survey, in THE NEW PSYCHOHISTORY,
353, 354 (Lloyd de Mause ed., 1975) (discussing the history of infanticide).
35. It seems to have been taken for granted that the upper classes were entitled
to the favors of pretty girls of the lower classes and that fornication was looked
upon as an inevitable aspect of lower class life. Yet if a girl became pregnant,
she was left to shift for herself. She at once became an object of obloquy and
might well be whipped out of the village by the more fortunate members of her
sex.
Id. at 356. As for discussing the disparate treatment of married and unmarried neonaticide
mothers:
[Tihe authorities contented themselves with the imposition of penance in the
case of married women, who were condemned to live for at least a year on bread
and water. The unwed mothers and the presumed witches, however, were to
bear the brunt as examples and admonitions. A girl known to have committed
infanticide in any form might be absolved by pleading insanity, but was
otherwise condemned to suffer the death penalty, usually in the most diabolical
imaginable manner. Medieval sources tell of women being tied in a sack, along
with a dog, a cock, or some other uncongenial companion and thrown into the
river for a supreme struggle for fife.
1999] NEONATICIDE AND THE MISUSE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
addition, this misuse clouds the definition of insanity and generates
a lack of confidence by society in the criminal justice system. The
insanity defense serves a valid purpose. There are criminal
defendants who are truly insane and should not be held criminally
responsible for their actions. If the misuse of the insanity defense
continues, however, these defendants may not get the help they
need.
Moreover, if these murdering mothers are sane, they should be
held responsible for their actions. Arguably, these mothers do not
pose a general threat to society; nevertheless, other goals of the
criminal justice system will be satisfied by punishing them. These
goals include retribution for the killing, vindication of the dead
baby's rights, and deterrence of others. Even if society believes
these mothers deserve lesser sentences, this end should be achieved
through legislation, not by perverting the criminal justice system
through misuse of the insanity defense.
INSANITY DEFENSE GENERALLY
Introduction
Every crime has two elements: (1) the actual criminal adt, the
actus reus, and (2) the intent to commit the criminal act, the mens
rea.36 American society believes that a person is not guilty of a
crime unless her intention is also guilty.3" Both elements, the act
and the intent, must be present for a defendant to be found guilty
of a crime.3" The insanity defense serves to negate the second
element-mens rea.39
The criminal justice system attempts to hold individuals
accountable for their criminal actions.' American society requires,
however, that an individual be able to tell right from wrong before
holding her responsible for those actions.41 In addition to this
ability to tell right from wrong, society also considers other factors
when determining whether someone should be held legally respon-
sible. Some of these factors, which also could be described as the
goals of the criminal justice system, include affixing moral blame,
seeking justice, protecting innocent victims, and deterring not only
36. See RALPH SLOVENKO, PSYCHIATRY AND CRIMINAL CuLPABILITY 35 (1995).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 7.
41. See id.
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future acts of the defendant, but also of other potential defen-
dants.42
Insanity in this context is a legal, rather than a psychiatric,
term.43 A criminal defendant is presumed to be sane." Insanity,
therefore, is an affirmative defense and must be proven by the
defendant.45 If a defendant is able to prove she is insane, then one
of two rulings is made. Depending on the jurisdiction, the defen-
dant is declared either "not guilty on the grounds of insanity," or
"guilty, but insane. ' If the defendant is declared "not guilty on the
grounds of insanity," then she will be examined to determine
whether she is still insane, and, if so, she will be treated at a
mental institution and may be released as soon as she is cured.4 v
If the defendant is found to be "guilty, but insane," then she will be
treated at a mental institution until she is cured.48 If the time it
takes for her to be cured, however, is less than that of the total
sentence for the crime, then the conviction stands and the defen-
dant must serve the remaining time.49
Approximately one quarter of the states have a "guilty but
mentally ill" verdict (GBMI).50 This verdict is described as an
intermediate verdict that is available when the defendant's mental
illness does not satisfy the test for insanity, but the state recognizes
that the defendant is in need of mental treatment in addition to
incarceration. 51
The question of whether a person is good or evil is different
from whether she is accountable for her actions.52 The system looks
at the individual's actions constituting the particular crime in
question, determines whether that person's actions were inten-
tional, and holds her accountable for those intentional acts.53
Absent a mental illness, "[a] person's upbringing and genetic
inheritance are immaterial to the question of whether, in a given
situation, she intended to act."54
42. See CARL ELLIOT, THE RULES OF INSANITY: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE
MENTALLY ILL OFFENDER 53 (1996).
43. See KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 19.
44. See SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 134.
45. See id.
46. See J. STANLEY MCQUADE, MEDICAL PRACTICE FOR TRIAL LAWYERS 684 (4th ed. 1993).
47. See id.; SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 181.
48. See SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 181.
49. See MCQUADE, supra note 46, at 684.
50. See SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 169.
51. See id. at 171.
52. See ELLIOT, supra note 42, at 65.
53. See id. at 70.
54. Id. at 69.
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For example, a man may have grown up in an abusive environ-
ment and witnessed his father beat his mother on numerous
occasions. When that boy grows up and later follows his father's
example and beats his own wife, one could argue that his actions
are the result of him having grown up in an abusive environment.
Although his actions may have been influenced by his upbringing,
he still intended to act when he beat his own wife and, therefore,
should be held accountable. Another example is the case of a poor
mother who steals food to feed her children. "We might want to be
more forgiving toward such people, and more sympathetic toward
their plight, but this does not mean that we should not hold them
responsible."55
Carl Elliot describes the "straight rule of responsibility" as
follows: a "person should be held morally responsible for all and
only his intentional actions.""' Mental illness, or legal insanity, is
one means by which an individual can act without intent and,
therefore, not be held responsible for her actions.57 "People are
shaped by their education, background, experience, health, and all
the influences of their lifetime. At the same time, every individual
has some capacity for choice. The law espouses the concept of free
will circumscribed by the insanity defense."58 The insanity defense
then, is not merely a judgment about mental illness, but in essence
it is "an expression of a belief that a person should or should not be
held responsible for his or her actions."59
Legal Standards
Jurisdictions use various tests to determine whether the
defendant was insane at the time of the crime and, therefore,
should not be held criminally responsible for her actions. Although
the tests vary in some respects, each test attempts to determine the
following two issues: "(a) whether the accused had a mental disease
or defect at the time of the offense, and (b) how the mental disease
or defect affected [the defendant's] cognition or control.""' The two
main tests currently used are the MNaghten test and the American
Law Institute (ALI) test.6'
55. Id. at 70.
56. Id. at 31.
57. See id.
58. SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 4.
59. Id. at 13.
60. Id. at 67.
61. See MARTIN BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW 444 (3d ed.
1992).
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M'Naghten Test
The M'Naghten test is the standard used in the majority of
United States jurisdictions.62 The M'Naghten standard defines an
individual as insane if:
at the time of committing the act, the party accused was
laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing,
or if he did know it that he did not know he was doing what was
wrong.'
The M'Naghten rule does not question whether the defendant
generally knows the difference between right and wrong, but
instead asks whether the defendant knew that her specific act was
wrong.64 In the M'Naghten case, the judge instructed the jury, "if
you should think the prisoner a person capable of distinguishing
right from wrong with respect to the act of which he stands
charged, then he is a responsible agent."65
The M'Naghten rule has been criticized because it examines
cognition or intellectual understanding without considering control
or emotion.66 For example, an individual could know that her
actions are wrong, but could not be able to control them. Under the
M'Naghten rule, this person would not be considered insane.
American Law Institute (ALI) Test
The test developed by the American Law Institute in 1955 is
the second most common test used in the United States.6 7 The ALI
test states:
"A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time
of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
62. See id. (table of standards by state); SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 17, 24. The test
originated in England in 1843. M'Naghten was a defendant who thought he was being
persecuted by the Tories and shot Edward Drummond, the Secretary to the Prime Minister,
under the mistaken belief that Drummond was Sir Robert Peel, the Prime Minister. See id.
63. KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 22.
64. See SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 20.
65. Id. at 17.
66. See id. at 20.
67. See BLINDER, supra note 61, at 444; SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 24.
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(wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law."'
The ALI definition specifically excludes psychopathic, also
referred to as sociopathic, behavior.69 In many cases, the psychia-
trist examining the defendant must determine whether the
defendant is psychotic and thereby insane, or simply psychopathic
and not insane. It should be noted that the defendant could be
neither-she could simply be a normal person who happened to
commit a very bad crime.
Psychopathy, or sociopathy, is "not a mental disease or defect,
but a global attitude of selfishness that governs a person's interac-
tions with others."7" This attitude "ultimately leads to exploitation
and the inflicting of pain on others in order to get one's way."
Psychopaths demonstrate "disregard for, and violation of, the rights
of others."72 They "are able to conform their behavior to the law,
but simply choose not to."73 Their behavior is such that some people
have concluded that, in essence, psychopaths are evil people.74
Psychopaths basically lack a conscience.75 They are "not
mentally ill; they are 'morally challenged.' They know the differ-
ence between right and wrong; they just don't care."76
Although it is certainly a mental disorder, sociopathy does not
reduce culpability for a crime. The sociopath knows right from
wrong, and will commit the crime because his internal "police-
man" is absent-but will not if there is an "external" policeman
watching. When caught--even caught red-handed-a sociopath
tends to shift the blame to others, to "circumstances," or offer
rationalizations for the behavior.7
Psychopaths should be held responsible for their crimes because,
regardless of how they feel about their crime, they are aware that
their actions are illegal and not condoned by the rest of society.
68. SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 24.
69. See id. at 104.
70. KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 83.
71. Barbara Kirwin, The Coed Baby Killer, COSMOPOLITAN, Sept. 1, 1997, at 23
(discussing Kirwin's psychological examination of Stephanie Wernick, the mother described
in the introduction of this Note).
72. KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 93.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 83.
75. See RONALD MARKMAN & DOMINICK Bosco, ALONE WITH THE DEVIL: FAMOUS CASES
OF A COURTROOM PSYCHIATRIST 91 (1989).
76. KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 32.
77. MARKMAN & BOSCO, supra note 75, at 91.
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This standard should apply to all individuals, psychopathic or not.
Consider, for example, an individual who thinks marijuana should
be legalized but knows that it is illegal. If she is caught in posses-
sion of it, she should be held accountable for her actions because she
knew that society regarded her conduct as criminal.
Psychopathic behavior essentially refers to repeated criminal
behavior or antisocial conduct.7' Therefore, repeated criminal
activity is not in itself a mental defect that relinquishes one from
responsibility. 9
A psychopathic individual must be distinguished from one who
is psychotic. A psychotic individual is one who suffers from
delusions and hallucinations and has experienced a break with
reality so extreme that she no longer knows the nature and
consequences of her actions.8s Because this individual no longer
understands that her actions are wrong or criminal, she should not
be held criminally responsible for her actions.8 ' Psychotics are
insane because they suffer from a mental disease that has affected
their ability to know right from wrong. 2
The M'Naghten and ALI tests differ in three ways. First, the
ALI test uses the term "appreciate" rather than "know"; apprecia-
tion requires a deeper understanding of the wrongfulness of one's
conduct.8 3 For example, a four-year-old may know not to touch a
stovetop, but may not really appreciate the fact that the stove is hot
and could burn her. The second difference between the two tests is
that the ALI test only requires that the defendant lack the
"substantial capacity" to appreciate the wrongfulness of her act,
whereas the M'Naghten test requires a total lack of such capacity. 8
Therefore, a defendant is less likely to be found insane under the
M'Naghten test than under the ALI test. The final difference
between the two tests is that the ALI test includes a volitional
component.85 If the defendant's mental illness causes him to lack
the "substantial capacity.., to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of the law," then he could be found to be insane.86 The
M'Naghten test focuses on cognition only, that is, whether the
78. See SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 104.
79. See id.
80. See KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 23.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 24.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Id.
[Vol. 6:259
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defendant knew her conduct was wrong.87 The ALl test considers
both cognition and control."8
Diminished Capacity
A defense allowed in approximately one third of the states is
that of diminished capacity. 9 This defense lowers, but does not
negate, criminal responsibility for one's actions.' A court could find
that although the defendant was not suffering from a mental
disease that rendered him insane at the time of his offense, the
defendant's "emotional and psychological state constituted a sort of
diminished capacity that affected his criminal intent and should be
taken into consideration in terms of his sentencing."91 The evidence
of diminished capacity can also be used to negate specific intent.92
For example, a defendant with diminished capacity could be found
guilty of manslaughter, but not first degree murder, if it is deter-
mined that her mental defect rendered her incapable of premedita-
tion, deliberation, or malice.93
The majority of jurisdictions permit expert testimony on the
mens rea element of the crime, without requiring the defendant to
enter an insanity plea. 94 In those instances, the evidence on the
mental state of the defendant would go toward refuting the specific
intent element of the crime.9' Even in jurisdictions that do not have
a specific diminished capacity defense, courts often will take the
defendant's personal situation and the circumstances of the crime
under consideration in determining punishment.96 For example, a
woman who hires someone to murder her battering husband should
be punished for her crime, but a court may give her a lesser
sentence to reflect the mitigating circumstances of her crime and
the fact that she may not pose a future threat to society.97
87. See id. at 68.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 152.
90. See ELLIOT, supra note 42, at 17.
91. KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 251.
92. See SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 151.
93. See id. at 152.
94. See id. at 157.
95. See id. at 44.
96. See id. at 154.
97. See id.
272 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 6:259
Heat of Passion
Another defense which can lower culpability is the heat of
passion defense.98 This defense can negate premeditation, delibera-
tion, and malice, thereby reducing a murder charge to manslaugh-
ter.99 The classic example of when the heat of passion defense is
used is when a husband comes home to find his wife in bed with
another man, enters into a jealous rage, and kills either his wife,
the other man, or both.'0 0 Although the husband was sane and
should be held responsible for his actions, society believes he is less
culpable for his actions because he was justifiably overcome by such
intense emotion. 1 1
Compulsion and Duress
In some instances, society does not hold a person responsible
for her actions even though she was sane at the time she committed
the crime.'0 2 Her actions can be said to be either justified or
excused.0 3 If her actions are justified, then her actions were
morally acceptable.0 4 An example of a justified action would be
self-defense. If a person's action is excused, then her action was
morally wrong, but society has determined that the actor should not
be held accountable.' 5 In other words, something about her
situation contributed to her making a bad choice; therefore, she
should not be judged harshly.' 6 Insanity, diminished capacity, and
heat of passion are all examples of defenses for which the defen-
dant's criminal actions are excused.
Sometimes a person's actions are excused if that person acted
under compulsion or duress. If one's actions are compelled, they are
said to be involuntary.10 7 In constrast, when acting under duress,
there is at least some element of volition.0 8 The person has made
98. See MARKMAN & Bosco, supra note 75, at 121.
99. See id.
100. See, e.g., Aiken v. State, 168 S.E. 34, 38 (Ga. 1933) (discussing the use of the heat of
passion defense when the defendant husband shoots and kills his wife and her lover after
finding them having sexual relations).
101. See MARKMAN & Bosco, supra note 75, at 121.
102. See ELLIOT, supra note 42, at 46-50.
103. See id. at 47.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 46.
108. See id.
1999] NEONATICIDE AND THE MISUSE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 273
the choice to act wrongly as a means of avoiding some harm.'0 9 It
is thought, however, that in some instances the person ought to face
harm herself rather than commit the action resulting in the harm'
of another, such as death.10 It also is thought that if the person
having to make a choice under duress is responsible for getting
herself into that situation, then that person should not be excused
from being forced to make a wrongful decision once in that situa-
tion."'
INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEONATICIDE CASES
Infanticide Act-England
In England, the highest charge a mother can receive for killing
her child is manslaughter."' In 1922, the British Infanticide Act
(Infanticide Act) was passed. It created a presumption that a
mother who kills her child is insane on the theory that "the balance
of her mind is disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered
from the effect of giving birth to the child."" 3 D'Orban found that
in ninety percent of maternal filicides, the British court's verdict
formally recognized that psychiatric disorder was thought to be
responsible for the offense.""
A presumption of insanity based on one's conduct alone creates
a circular diagnosis problem. This presumption means that a
person's actions define her mental status. Her behavior is used to
diagnose her mental disorder, and the disorder is then used as an
excuse for her behavior." 5 The problem arises when society allows
the existence of a mental disorder to be a per se excuse for criminal
activity. "[O]rdinarily we exonerate the mentally ill from responsi-
bility for their actions not simply because they are mentally ill, but
because of the particular way in which their disorders have affected
their thinking.
" 116
109. See id.
110. See id. at 25.
111. See id. at 50.
112. See Interview by Jacki Lyden with Maribeth Emerson, Dr. Margaret Spinelly, Daniel
Irma, and Margaret Carson, All Things Considered (NPR radio broadcast, June 27, 1997)
(discussing recent cases of neonaticide).
113. Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern American
Infanticide, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 15 (1996) (quoting the British Infanticide Act of 1922
(amended 1938)).
114. See d'Orban, supra note 6, at 560.
115. See ELLIOT, supra note 42, at 62.
116. Id. at 63.
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This problem often arises when the crime is considered
egregious. For example, in the case of a serial killer who mutilates
the bodies of her victims, society often assumes that the killer must
be suffering from some sort of mental disease to have committed
such horrible crimes. Society uses a given mental disorder to
describe this sort of conduct, rather than determining whether the
killer really was suffering from some sort of mental disease that
caused her actions.
Rather than determining if an actual mental illness exists on
a case-by-case basis, the British courts examine the mother's act
alone and presume that a mother who kills her child must be
insane."' The Infanticide Act also does not take into account the
differences between neonaticide and filicide cases."' Yet as
indicated previously, the circumstances and motivations differ
greatly between neonaticides and filicides." 9
The Infanticide Act appears to be both an attempt to explain a
crime that may be hard for society to understand and a means of
circumventing the normal criminal justice system by providing for
lesser punishment of these maternal killers. "[E]ven at the time of
the Act's passage, it was unclear whether the Act was based on an
actual belief that women who kill their children were mentally ill,
or whether 'a medical model was adopted to justify moderation in
the imposition of punishments.'' 2 0
The Infanticide Act does not offer much protection to newborns.
One study found that in England and Wales, children less than one
year old are four times as likely to become victims of homicide than
either older children or the general population.'12
British law also differentiates between mothers and fathers
who commit infanticide. "The law appears to assume a physiologi-
cal basis for diminished responsibility in this context. No such
legislation exists for fathers who kill their children." 22 In England,
the mothers found to have killed their newborns have a greater
than fifty percent chance of not even being indicted for the killing. 123
Even if the mother is indicted, she is likely to be convicted only of
117. See Mendlowicz et al., supra note 6, at 212 (explaining that the Infanticide Act, by
definition, creates a presumption of insanity).
118. See id. at 211.
119. See id.; see also supra notes 3, 8-13 and accompanying text.
120. Oberman, supra note 113, at 16.
121. See Marks & Kumar, supra note 6, at 329 (describing results of study conducted of
infanticide in England).
122. Id. (discussing the disparate treatment of neonaticide mothers and fathers).
123. See id.
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infanticide and receive only probation. 124 In a study of killings of
children less than one year old by one of the parents, it was found
that eighty-four percent of the convicted fathers received prison
sentences, whereas only nineteen of the mothers did.
121
[Tihe data suggest that for both men and women, sentencing
was a function of the sex of the perpetrator and not related to
the overt violence of the offense .... It appears that while men
were more likely to kill their infants in a more mutilatively
violent way than women, irrespective of how the child was
killed, men received more severe punishments than women. 2,
The Infanticide Act acknowledges the fact that the act of childbirth
can be an extremely stressful and overwhelming experience, and it
seems to conclude that the act of childbirth renders all women
temporarily insane. As a result, these women are not to be held
responsible for any actions committed in proximity to the birth.127
The United States does not have a statute comparable to the
British Infanticide Act, but the same end goal of excusing these
murderers still is sought in the United States. 12  The vehicle for
achieving this goal in the United States is the insanity defense.
General Test
Regardless of which insanity standard is used, each test
requires, as a threshold matter, that the defendant have a mental
disease or defect.12 9 There are two steps in determining whether
124. See id. at 334.
125. See id. at 336.
126. Id.
127. Consider the following discussion of d'Orban's study:
There is some recognition by the law in this country [England], embodied in the
Infanticide Act, that motherhood places uniquely demanding strains on the
capacity of some women to contain their murderous impulses. Justification for
this recognition lies partly in the view that physiological changes accompanying
parturition [childbirth] may place women at an increased risk of mental illness.
It is true that psychoses occur more frequently in women shortly after
childbirth. However, only 24 of the 89 women in D'Orban's study were
classified by him as "mentally ill," and only 14 of these were psychotic.
Furthermore, only 2124 (8%) of the women categorized as "mentally ill'
subsequently received infanticide verdicts whereas 21/65 (32%) of the other
women did so. D'Orban concludes that, "contrary to medico-legal tradition,
puerperal [related to childbirth] psychotic illness is a relatively rare cause of
maternal filicide."
Id. at 338.
128. See Oberman, supra note 113, at 9.
129. See SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 52.
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someone is insane and, therefore, should not be held responsible for
her criminal actions. The first step requires finding out whether
the person was mentally ill at the time she committed the crime. 0
If the answer to that question is yes, then one must determine "how
much did this person's mental disease interfere with her ability to
know what she was doing, what the consequences would be, and
that the actions were wrong."' 3 ' This second question may vary
somewhat depending on which insanity test the jurisdiction uses,
but all insanity tests require that at the time of the crime the
defendant be suffering from some sort of mental disease and that
the mental disease caused the person's actions.
132
A person can be suffering from a mental disease at the time of
the crime, but if that disease did not somehow impair her ability to
know right from wrong or control her actions, then she is not insane
and must be held accountable for her actions. 3 3 In other words, the
mental illness must be causally connected to the crime.134 The
mental illness or defect is relevant only if it impairs cognition or
control at the time of the crime.1
35
Dr. Barbara R. Kirwin provides an example of a mentally ill
person to whom the insanity defense did not apply. This young
man knew what he was doing when he set fire to his grandmother's
house after she denied his request for money:
This young man's mental illness was chronic and well docu-
mented. No one disputed that he was psychologically impaired.
Nevertheless, the M'Naghten Rule revolves around knowing
right from wrong. It is improbable that his express intention
was to kill his grandmother and young cousin, or severely burn
his relatives and the family hiome. In his rage and frustration
at having been denied his wishes, he could focus only on
wanting to punish them and teach them a lesson. But he was
capable of formulating a plan that included trapping his family
and permitting his own escape. He knew what gasoline could
do; he knew the danger of fire. He lied to the police and firemen
at the scene, an indication that he was aware he had done
something illegal. Under M'Naghten, his insanity defense
failed and he was convicted of arson.
136
130. See KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 58.
131. Id.
132. See SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 52.
133. See id. at 119.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 58-59.
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Therefore, a defendant can be suffering from a mental disease and
still be held criminally responsible for a given crime. If the mental
disease did not cause the crime or prevent the defendant from
knowing that what she was doing was wrong, then she was not
insane at the time of the crime and should be held responsible for
that crime.
Categorizing Mental Illness
In federal criminal cases, the Federal Rules of Evidence govern
the introduction of expert testimony relating to a defendant's
mental condition at the time of the crime.'37 The Federal Rules do
not require the expert to specify or categorize the mental illness
from which the defendant was suffering,'38 nor do they allow the
expert to testify as to the ultimate sanity issue. 3 9 For example, the
expert can testify as to the symptoms of a given mental disease and
then testify which symptoms the defendant demonstrated, but the
expert cannot make the conclusion that the defendant was insane
at the time of the crime and therefore should not be held responsi-
ble for the crime. That final task is for the fact finder.
One reason that the expert cannot testify as to the ultimate
insanity issue is that the expert cannot really know the defendant's
state of mind at the time of the crime. Regardless of which insanity
standard is applied, the expert's "testimony must describe the
offender's state of mind at the time of the commission of the offense.
It is necessary to project back from the time of the examination to
the offense." 4 ° This is difficult to do. For example, in neonaticide
cases, the mental examination is made after the mother is charged
with the crime. It would be difficult for the expert to determine
with certainty whether the mother's stress level and heightened
mental state at the time of the examination are the result of the
birth or from the killing and being charged with the killing. A post-
crime examination will not conclusively determine whether the
mental condition caused the act, or whether the mental condition
was caused by the act, particularly when there is no evidence of
mental defect prior to the commission of the crime.
Another problem with categorizing mental diseases and
attempting to diagnose the defendant after the crime is that the
diagnosis "leads to a false assumption that disorders of a common
137. See FED. R. EVID. 702; SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 116.
138. See SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 116.
139. See id. at 137-38; FED. R. EVID. 704.
140. SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 136.
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name show an absolute sameness, or that the disorders have a
distinct symptomatology.""' For example, not all schizophrenics
suffer the same symptoms to the same degree. Moreover, the
degree to which a defendant was suffering from a particular mental
disease can have a bearing on culpability. A defendant could have
been suffering from a mental disease, but still have appreciated the
criminality of her actions.
Experts do, however, try to fit the defendant into a particular
diagnosis in an attempt to help the fact finder understand the
defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime. Nevertheless,
regardless of how the psychiatric community would classify the
defendant, "what is and what is not mental illness in the test of
criminal responsibility depends on our sense of both justice and
protection of society."14 2 Society's views change over time. "The
way society labels a particular cluster of mental characteristics
corresponds to how it feels about the individual, and society is
constantly changing its mind to accommodate competing policy
interests." 3
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Diseases
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Diseases
(DSM) is published by the American Psychiatric Association and is
the standard manual used by psychiatrists when diagnosing
patients.1 44 When psychiatrists testify as to a defendant's mental
condition, their testimony is usually presented using terms found
in the DSM. However, the "DSM was prepared for clinical, not
legal purposes .... [The] purposes of diagnosis for the clinician are
treatment and research, not accountability."1 45 Therefore, not every
condition listed as a diagnosis in the DSM constitutes a mental
illness or defect for the purpose of the insanity defense. 146 For
example, nicotine dependence is listed as a diagnosis in the DSM,147
but the justice system is not likely to excuse a defendant from
responsibility for a crime because she is addicted to cigarettes. The
DSM even contains its own disclaimer: "Even when diminished
141. Id. at 65.
142. Id. at 117.
143. Id. at 131.
144. See id. at 55. The DSM has been through various revisions. The DSM.I was
published in 1952, DSM-II in 1968, DSM.III in 1980, DSM-III-R in 1987, and the latest
version, DSM-IV, was published in 1994. See id.
145. Id. at 58.
146. See id. at 55.
147. See id.
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control over one's behavior is a feature of the disorder, having the
diagnosis in itself does not demonstrate that a particular individual
is (or was) unable to control his or her behavior at a particular
time."4 ' Therefore, the DSM provides a useful, "common basis for
assessing accountability, but the law is not limited to it in defining
mental illness." 49
Temporary Insanity
Before discussing what constitutes a mental illness that could
cause someone to be insane, it is important to note that there is no
such thing as temporary insanity.'" Although media and defense
attorneys would like society to believe otherwise, "people don't 'just
snap.'' 51 If the criminal is truly insane, the symptoms of mental
illness are there long before the criminal act."5 2 "[Pisychotic
illnesses are progressive diseases of gradual deterioration in
functioning,""5 and "nearly every homicide committed by an insane
individual has been preceded by some signs of irrationality."1 4 If
a person is truly suffering from a mental disease, a requirement of
every insanity standard, the criminal act will not represent the
onset of the disease-it is instead a manifestation of the disease.
Mental disease should not be confused with heat of passion.
The two defenses describe two different mental states. When
someone is suffering from a mental disease and that disease causes
her actions, that person either does not know the difference
between right and wrong or was unable to control her actions. 5
This is very different from the heat of passion experienced when
finding your spouse in bed with another person and becoming so
enraged that you kill the other person. Society may be willing to
excuse both kinds of conduct, but the defendants in these two
situations possess different mental states. 15
6
Dr. Ronald Markman describes the case of a battered wife with
a very passive personality who murdered her husband in his sleep
and then dialed 911:
148. Id. at 59.
149. Id. at 59.
150. See KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 93, 192.
151. Id. at 25.
152. See id. at 122.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 24.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 40-59 (discussing the rationale behind criminal
defenses based on mental incapacity).
156. See KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 24.
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[Sihe [was not] legally insane at the time she shot him. There
simply was not enough mental impairment to blind her to how
wrong the act was. In other words, she may have been at wits'
end and had not really known what to do, given her personality,
but she still knew it was wrong to kill her husband. She wasn't
out of control. After all, she was able to properly inform others
of the act immediately thereafter.
Laura may have been experiencing extreme fear of her hus-
band, and killing him was certainly inconsistent with her
personality, but there simply was no evidence of a legally
significant mental breakdown. She was able to form the intent
to kill and to harbor malice. In short, though I felt tremendous
sympathy for her and her plight, I felt she was mentally capable
of committing second-degree murder.5 '
A person who is mentally ill is not capable of making a choice.
Because she cannot distinguish right from wrong, there really is no
choice for her to make. In contrast, a sane person, faced with the
same choices, is capable of choosing and just may make a poor
choice to commit the crime. Society may sympathize with some
defendants, but because they were capable of distinguishing right
from wrong, they should be held accountable for their choice.
FROM WHAT MENTAL ILLNESS Do THESE MURDERING MOMS
SUFFER?
Again, there are two basic elements that must be proven for an
insanity defense to be successful: (1) the defendant must have been
suffering from a mental illness at the time she committed the
crime, and (2) that mental illness must have caused the defendant
to not know or appreciate that what she was doing was wrong or
rendered her unable to control her actions. 58
Once the baby's body is found, proving that the mother was
responsible for killing the baby is generally not difficult because the
method of killing usually makes it self-evident that the killing
occurred at the hands of the mother. 5 ' Assuming that the prosecu-
tion can prove that the death was intentional and not accidental,
the prosecution's case is often very strong. In many cases, the
157. MARKMAN & Bosco, supra note 75, at 153.
158. See supra notes 60-88 and accompanying text (describing the test for insanity under
the MNaghten and ALI standards).
159. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (describing the manner of death).
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defendant's only defense will be to plead insanity. In order to prove
that a mother was insane when she killed her baby, the defense
must prove that the. mother was actually suffering from some
mental illness. 6 ' From what mental illness, if any, is it that these
mothers purportedly are suffering that causes them to murder their
children?
Dissociation and Denial
There has been much dispute about what mental illness, if any,
affects these mothers. Some experts claim these mothers enter a
state of denial in which they claim to not even know that they are
pregnant, and as a result they become psychotic during the birth.'6'
Dr. Margaret Spinelly stated that the mothers "don't consciously
hide it, they dissociate from it."62 The problem with this theory is
that many of the defendants do not just deny the pregnancy, but
they take actual steps to conceal the pregnancy from their families
by wearing baggy clothing and giving birth in secret. Spinelly
describes the mothers' actions as a "dissociative experience," in
which the mothers describe watching themselves kill the babies and
place them in plastic bags.'63 One study conducted of neonaticide
defendants found that all nine of the mothers examined "tested
positively for dissociative disorders in which people see themselves
doing actions in a dreamlike state."6 4 The same study, however,
also found that all nine of the subjects had no prior history of social
pathology."15
Dissociation is a term that is often used in an insanity defense
when the defendant describes an "out-of-body-like" experience in
which she "sees herself committing the crime." Dissociation is
described as:
states where normal connections between things are absent or
loosened .... [D]isorders in which a person does not perceive
the self as an integrated whole, present experiences and past
memories are not linked together... or the person does not feel
related to what is going on around him .... [These feelings are]
160. See supra text accompanying note 45.
161. See Que, supra note 4 (statement of Dr. Neal Kaye).
162. Katharine Q. Seelye, What Leads Young Women to Kill Their Newborns?, FORT
WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, June 18, 1997, at B1 (quoting Dr. Margaret Spinelly).
163. See Que, supra note 4 (statement of Dr. Margaret Spinelly).
164. Lyden, supra note 112 (statement of Dr. Margaret Spinelly).
165. See id.
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often stress related and may come on suddenly or gradually and
may be transient or long lasting (chronic).'
The essential feature of dissociation is a "disturbance or
alteration in the normally integrative functions of identity, memory,
or consciousness."167 If the dissociation affects one's identity
function, the resulting effect may manifest itself as multiple
personality disorder. 6" If the dissociation affects one's perception
of reality, it may be classified as depersonalization disorder. 6 9
Finally, if the memory function is affected, it may be termed as
psychogenic amnesia or psychogenic fugue. 70
The proximate cause of dissociation "is almost always an
encounter with an overwhelming emotional situation or pain
beyond the coping mechanism of the conscious self. It may occur in
someone with no previous history of mental illness, and is usually,
a single,. isolated episode.""'
The person who commits an offense-and it is often a serious
one-while in a dissociative state, later neither remembers nor
believes what he has done, and in any event truly wishes he had
not done it. This wish is not simply post-facto remorse or a self-
serving consequence of his having been apprehended, but
springs from deep within. In other words, the criminal act does
not really fit into the accused's makeup, and is not performed
out of his conscious desires.
A dissociative state may also occur following a premedi-
tated crime which had unexpectedly dire consequences, such as
the candy-store robbery that results in the death of the propri-
etor. Such a dissociation merely disconnects memory traces
from consciousness, and rarely alters behavior: the offender
may bury the murder weapon while disclaiming, even to
himself, his ever having used it.
A man who commits homicide during a dissociative state
is probably not capable of either premeditation, formation of
intent, or malice. His liability would increase, however, with
166. MCQUADE, supra note 46, at 136 (Supp. 1996).
167. SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 73.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. BLINDER, supra note 61, at 465.
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evidence of some penetration into conscious awareness and
control (as evinced by incriminating statements and behavior
before and after the act), or with evidence that the dissociative
state was more a reaction to the offense than it was a state of
mind bringing it about. In short, a psychiatric defense is
eminently appropriate if a man kills because he is deranged,
but not if he is deranged because he has killed.172
Therefore, it is possible that "in a dissociative state, an
individual may act with little or no conscious awareness or
intent."" 3 Nevertheless, the question becomes whether the
defendant was acting in a dissociative state at the time she
committed the crime or whether the dissociative state was a
reaction to her crime. Also, even if the defendant were acting in a
dissociative state, does that mean she had no conscious awareness
or intent, or is it possible there was "some penetration into
conscious awareness and control"' 74-enough to hold her responsi-
ble? Because the defendant is not examined until after the crime,
it is difficult for the examining psychiatrist to determine whether
the defendant was acting in a dissociative state at the time of the
crime and whether that state caused her to commit the crime.
Another psychiatrist, Dr. Randi Zoot, describes what he calls
"neonaticide dissociative disorder."175 This "disorder perpetuates a
state of denial so strong that the mother does not realize she is
pregnant or has gone into labor and can accidentally kill the
child."77 An examination of the circumstances of these killings,
however, casts doubt on whether they can be characterized as
accidental.'77 How does strangling a baby with one's bare hands or
172. Id. at 466-67.
173. SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 38.
174. BLINDER, supra note 61, at 466.
175. T. Shawn Taylor, Woman with Disorder Gets Probation in Infant's Death, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 7, 1998, at Al (discussing case of a 21-year-old woman who killed her newborn daughter
and claimed she was suffering from "neonaticide dissociative disorder").
176. Id.
177. For instance, Marianne Biancuzzo drowned her newborn daughter in the toilet,
wrapped the baby's head in a plastic bag and then wrapped the baby and the placenta in a
flannel shirt and shoved everything into a three pound coffee can which she then hid under
the bathroom sink. See Kristen Cook, Teens Who Kill Babes at Birth Not Unusual, ARIZ.
DAILY STAR, Nov. 24, 1997, at B1.
Kathryn Burton struck and killed her son and then buried him in her backyard. See
David Knox, Getting Tough on Moms, AKRON BEAcON J., Mar. 1, 1998, at Al.
Linda Chu gave birth to her baby girl in her dorm room, strangled the baby and then
shoved her daughter's body into a trash chute. See Cook, supra.
Melissa Drexler delivered her baby boy in a high school bathroom during her prom.
Drexler hid her son's body in a trash can and then returned to the dance floor. A
maintenance worker spotted blood on the floor of the bathroom. When Drexler was first
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with the umbilical cord, stuffing toilet paper down the baby's
throat, or stuffing a baby in a garbage bag and throwing the baby
in a dumpster happen by accident?
In many of the neonaticide cases, when the insanity defense is
used, the defense often claims that the defendant was in denial
about her pregnancy. Experts dispute whether this state of denial
is an actual mental disorder or the result of self-deception. 17
Society is more inclined to hold a person accountable for her actions
in the case of self-deception than if her delusions arose from
completely involuntary conditions. 7 ' Nevertheless, "even if a
person bears little responsibility for acquiring his beliefs, he still
chooses whether or not to act on them."80 So, in the case of a
mother who is in denial concerning her pregnancy, even up until
the time of the actual birth, she has a choice concerning what to do
once the baby is born and she can no longer deny the pregnancy.
Psychiatrist Steven Pitt describes this state of denial as a defense
mechanism.18 ' He states that the mothers "see the baby as an
object, not a human being." 182
asked about the blood, she said it was not hers. Then she said she was having a heavy
menstrual period. After her son's body was discovered, she admitted giving birth to the baby.
An autopsy revealed that the baby had been asphyxiated and strangled. See Jennifer Farrell
& Angela Couloumbis, Guilty Plea Is Expected in Death of Baby at Prom, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER, July 8, 1998, at Bi; Knox, supra; Lyden, supra note 112.
Amy Grossberg delivered her son in a motel room. With the help of her boyfriend,
Brian Peterson, Grossberg bashed her son's skull in and left his body in a trash bin. See
Chavez, supra note 4, at 15A, Cook, supra.
Rebecca Hopfer's newborn daughter was found dead in a double plastic bag at a trash
collection center. See Knox, supra.
Audrey lacona's son was found wrapped in a bloody towel inside two plastic kitchen
garbage bags. See Knox, supra.
Carolyn Johnson's baby was found abandoned in a trash bin. See Knox, supra.
Jennifer Pyles's baby was found stuffed in a garbage bag inside the trunk of a car.
See Knox, supra.
Patricia Riedel's newborn was found alive in a trashcan near her home. See Knox,
supra.
Melissa Seaner's dead baby was found stuffed inside a gym bag hidden in her parents'
garage. See Marie McCullough, More Babies Killed by Middle-Class Moms, MIAMI HERALD,
Nov. 27, 1997, at C9.
Selfa Silva gave birth to her son into a toilet while at a slumber party. Silva
strangled her son and dumped his body in a trash bin. See Cook, supra.
Heidi Sonnenberg gave birth to her daughter on her parenits' bathroom floor.
Sonnenberg then cut the umbilical cord with nail clippers, wrapped her daughter in a towel,
and stashed the baby's body in her dresser drawer. See Stephen Hunt, Mental Illness Spares
Woman, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sep. 15, 1998, at B1.
178. See ELLOT, supra note 42, at 93-94.
179. See id. at 93-94.
180. Id. at 94.
181. See Cook, supra note 177.
182. Id. (quoting Steven Pitt).
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One defendant, Twyana Davis, who dumped her baby in the
trash after giving birth in her college dorm room, has been de-
scribed as suffering from this denial disorder: "like many women
in her situation, Davis went into a psychological fog about her
condition, up through the actual delivery on her dorm room floor." 83
At trial, Davis claimed to have been in a state of denial, not
realizing that she was pregnant. 184 In an interview following the
crime, however, Davis stated that while pregnant, she "watched
research material and got videotapes and books and read up on
childbirth."'85 If she did not know she was pregnant, why would she
bother to conduct research on childbirth?
Although it is possible that an individual mother could have
been suffering from a mental illness that caused her to murder her
newborn baby or that prevented her from knowing that killing her
baby was wrong, a "fallacy exists that mothers who kill their
children must be mentally ill." 8 ' In a study conducted of seven
neonaticide cases which occurred in Iowa during a fourteen month
period, Dr. Edward Saunders found that "[iun no case report was
there an indication that the mothers were mentally ill."18 7 Further-
more, Resnick also found no evidence of a so-called "neonaticide
syndrome." 88 He concluded that in most neonaticide cases, the
motive is simply to eliminate the problem. 89
Postpartum Psychosis
Defense attorneys in neonaticide cases also have attempted to
claim that the defendant was suffering from postpartum psychosis
at the time of the killing. 9 ° Susan Hickman, a psychologist, has
stated that "women who kill their newborns have probably experi-
enced an untreated postpartum disorder in a previous pregnancy or
183. Barbara Fitzsimmons, Keeping Hope Alive, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Nov. 8, 1997, at
El (describing the case of Twyana Davis and discussing various expert opinions on
neonaticide).
184. See id.
185. Geraldo: How Could They? Teen Moms Who Throw Away Their Babies (Investigative
News Group television broadcast, Oct. 2, 1997).
186. Logan, supra note 6, at 208.
187. Saunders, supra note 6, at 371.
188. See Knox, supra note 177.
189. See id.
190. See Kirwin, supra note 71, at 24. Postpartum psychosis is described as a rare
disorder suffered by some women following childbirth. See Anne Damante Brusca,
Postpartum Psychosis: A Way Out for Murderous Moms?, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1133, 1144
(1990). "Symptoms include confusion, delirium, hallucinations, insomnia, emotional lability,
fatigue and irritability." Id.
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delivery."' 9 ' The problem with Hickman's theory is that most
neonaticide mothers are first-time mothers and have not experi-
enced a prior pregnancy or delivery.'92 Not only is postpartum
psychosis an extremely rare disorder, it does not set in until at least
the third day after the delivery.'93 Therefore, postpartum psychosis
could not explain a murder that occurred within twenty-four hours
of the birth.
Wernick and Brief Reactive Psychosis
Stephanie Wernick was charged with criminally negligent
homicide for the murder of her newborn."94 The case went to the
highest appellate level in New York, a jurisdiction that still uses
the Frye test for the admissibility of expert testimony.195 Wernick
raised the insanity defense, "claiming that she lacked the substan-
tial capacity to know and to appreciate the nature and conse-
quences of her conduct or that such conduct was wrong."9 '
Wernick's attorneys claimed she was suffering from "neonaticide
syndrome" when she killed her baby.' 97 On appeal from the trial
court, the mid-level appellate court held that expert testimony on
"neonaticide syndrome" was not admissible without evidence that
it was generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.
198
The court stated that general acceptance of this syndrome could be
"established through texts and scholarly articles on the subject,
expert testimony, or court opinions."' 99 Using this standard, the
court held that the defense had not established "neonaticide
191. Anna Cekola, Mother Faces Trial in Death of Newborn, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1997, at
A3 (discussing the case of Jackie Lynn Anderson, a 38-year-old woman who murdered her
newborn son after giving birth in her mother's bathroom; Anderson's mother later found the
dead baby in a cardboard box in the trunk of Anderson's car).
192. See Mendlowicz et al., supra note 6, at 211; Resnick, supra note 2, at 65.
193. See Marcia Baran, Postpartum Psychosis: A Psychiatric Illness, a Legal Defense to
Murder, or Both?, 10 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 121, 123 (1989); Lori A. Button, Postpartum
Psychosis: The Birth of a New Defense?, 6 COOLEY L. REv. 323, 327 (1989); Logan, supra note
6, at 205.
194. See People v. Wernick, 651 N.Y.S.2d 392, 393 (N.Y. 1996).
195. The Frye Test requires that "[blefore an expert may testify about the exist-
ence of a mental disease or syndrome, the party seeking the introduction of
such testimony must establish that the disease or syndrome is generally
accepted in the field of psychiatry or psychology and that it would assist the
jury in rendering a verdict."
People v. Wernick, 632 N.Y.S.2d 839, 840 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. Id.
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syndrome" as a generally accepted syndrome in the psychological
community. 00 The court allowed Wernick's psychiatrists to testify
that she was in denial about her pregnancy and that she suffered
from brief reactive psychosis during the birth; however, they were
not allowed to describe her symptoms as a syndrome.2 ' The court
allowed the psychiatrists to testify as to the specific defendant,
Wernick; however, they could not refer to a profile explaining why
mothers kill their babies.20 2 The finding was affirmed when the
case went to the highest appellate level in New York.20 3
The defense claimed specifically that Wernick was suffering
from "brief reactive psychosis" following a "pathological denial" of
pregnancy.2 "' The defense gave the catch-all phrase of neonaticide
syndrome to describe Wernick's denial of the pregnancy and her
"brief reactive psychosis."20 5 The defense also claimed that her
neonaticide syndrome caused her to lack the "substantial capacity
to know and to appreciate the nature and consequences of her
conduct or that such conduct was wrong."20 6
Brief reactive psychosis is defined as:
[A]n isolated episode of psychotic symptoms of sudden onset
precipitated by major stress such as the loss of a loved one or
the psychological trauma of combat, of brief duration-from a
few hours to several weeks, with eventual full return to
premorbid level of functioning. It is characterized by delusions,
hallucinations, disorganized or catatonic behavior, incoherence,
confusion, emotional turmoil, marked loosening of associations,
inappropriate affect, and bizarre speech and behavior.0 7
Experts disagree as to whether brief reactive psychosis is an actual
mental defect. Brief reactive psychosis has been described as a
"fancy psychiatric term for 'just snapping. '' 208 This mental condi-
tion is often used in insanity defenses but is not considered to be a
true mental disease by the American Psychiatric Association.20 9
Barbara Kirwin, a psychologist who examined Wernick following
the murder, stated that she had never seen anyone diagnosed with
200. See id. at 841.
201. See id. at 841-42.
202. See id.
203. See People v. Wernick, 651 N.Y.S.2d. 392, 393 (N.Y. 1996).
204. See Wernick, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 394; Wernick, 632 N.Y.S.2d. at 840.
205. See Wernick, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 840.
206. Id.
207. BLINDER, supra note 61, at 31.
208. KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 150.
209. See id. at 93; Kirwin, supra note 71, at 23.
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brief reactive psychosis, "except for the purposes of an insanity
defense."21 ° The condition was officially dropped from the most
recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Diseases, DSM-IV, in 1994.211
Even if the psychiatric community recognized brief reactive
psychosis as a mental illness, the diagnosis does not seem to match
Wernick's actual conduct during the killing. Not only was Wernick
not in some daze or fog, but she very coherently responded to her
friends' offers of help by saying she was just having her period.212
She then proceeded to place her son in a garbage bag along with her
bloody clothes and asked her roommate to carry the garbage bag
containing the body of her son out to the dumpster. 13 These sound
less like the actions of someone suffering from a mental illness who
had no idea that she was killing her baby and more like the actions
of a cold-blooded killer who was doing everything she could to rid
herself of a problem.
Wernick underwent a psychiatric evaluation shortly after the
murder. "[Sihe was discharged with one of the mildest possible
diagnoses: 'adjustment disorder with disturbance of conduct.' 214
Wernick's attorneys also claimed that she suffered from amnesia as
a result of this neonaticide syndrome. Yet, not only did Wernick
confess to a paramedic shortly after the murder that she had given
birth to her son, in a psychological examination of Wernick
following the murder she did not claim to not remember putting her
son into the garbage bag and asking her friend to dispose of the
body.215 Wernick's test scores during this examination showed no
signs of mental illness, depression, or thought disorder.216 During
the examination, Wernick "never once expressed regret for her
actions, or grief for her baby. [Wernick's] consistent theme was the
effect of the murder rap on her."217 Kirwin found that Wernick
"scored impressively in ego strength and resilience. Such personali-
ties are not prone to panic in emergencies and are known for their
unusual capacity to face ordeals."218
Wernick was not diagnosed with brief reactive psychosis at any
of the three hospitals where she was treated after she killed her
210. Kirwin, supra note 71, at 23.
211. See KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 93; Kirwin, supra note 71, at 23.
212. See KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 67.
213. See id. at 67-68.
214. Kirwin, supra note 71, at 23.
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. Id.
218. KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 78.
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son.219 Nor were any of the experts at Wernick's trial able to testify
that Wernick demonstrated the features essential to a diagnosis of
brief reactive psychosis.22 ° Kirwin found that "when she murdered
her baby, [Wernick's] behavior did not match the requirements for
the diagnosis, which include rapid emotional shifts, overwhelming
confusion, and inarticulate speech. On the morning she killed her
baby, [Wernick] was calm and deliberate."
221
Kirwin found that Wernick bore all the selfish, goal-centered
traits characteristic of a true psychopath.222 So, was Wernick
mentally ill or just guilty?
It is important to note that even if someone is suffering from a
kind of mental condition or psychological reaction to a stressful
event, that condition alone is not enough to make that person
insane and not responsible for their actions.223 Only if that person
is suffering from an actual mental illness that made them incapable
of realizing that what they were doing was wrong should that
person be relieved of responsibility for their crime.224 Even if
Wernick had been in a state of denial during the pregnancy, that
does not necessarily mean that she did not know what she was
doing when she placed her baby in the garbage bag.
Even if there is such a thing as neonaticide syndrome, the
question remains whether it is really something about which juries
need to hear expert testimony and whether the presence of this
syndrome should negate culpability. It seems unnecessary to
require an expert to explain to a jury that a young, single, first-time
mother fears telling her family that she is pregnant and does
whatever it takes to prevent them from finding out. It is hard to
believe that this fear and the attempt to avoid the shame that
society attaches to illegitimate childbirths is really a mental illness
219. See id. at 93.
220. See id. at 93-94.
[A]ll the experts who were bound by the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-III-R
could not honestly say that Stephanie manifested "behavior that may be
bizarre, including peculiar postures, outlandish dress, screaming or muteness,"
or speech that "may include inarticulate gibberish or repetition of nonsensical
phrases," transient hallucinations or delusions, or silly answers to factual
questions.
Id.
221. Kirwin, supra note 71, at 23.
222. See id.
223. See supra notes 60-88 and accompanying text (outlining the requirements of and the
rationale behind the insanity defense).
224. See id.
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that prevents these mothers from realizing that killing their babies
is wrong.
Designer Defenses
Dr. Barbara Kirwin has coined the phrase "designer defense"
to describe
a psychological defense used in an insanity plea which is
carefully fabricated to fit all the pertinent facts of the case, and
then tailored to individual characteristics of the defendant that
might appeal to a jury-all regardless of whether any bona fide
incapacitating mental illness exists. The nature of a particular
designer defense is determined by what sympathy-evoking
excuses are in vogue at the time of the trial. All designer
defenses propound the idea of defendant as victim ....
Dr. Kirwin states that inventive expert witnesses have "found
a way of circumventing the diagnostic limitations of DSM-IV."
226
Syndromes are created which merely describe "symptoms, traits,
and behaviors [that] are observed to occur together in an individ-
ual."227  Examples of these syndromes include: adopted child
syndrome, battered woman syndrome, Vietnam syndrome, and
sexual abuse syndrome. 28 These syndromes are then presented to
juries through the use of expert testimony thereby lending credibil-
ity in the minds of the jury members to the existence of such
syndromes. Claiming that the defendant suffered from one of these
syndromes "can be a far more simple, stylish, and comprehensible
explanation for [a] horror than saying she simply chose to do evil.
The jurors can thus justify their own willing suspension of disbe-
lief. 22
9
Quick Recovery
Two circumstances are often considered in determining
whether someone was truly insane when she committed the crime:
(1) "recovery time" and (2) "knowing the wrong."2"0  The first
225. KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 115; see also id. at 97-130 (giving examples of cases in which
a designer defense was used).
226. Id. at 115-16.
227. Id. at 116.
228. See id. at 116.
229. Id. at 112.
230. KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 173.
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circumstance, recovery time, is how quickly she recovered from her
supposed mental disease."' For example, if the mother was "able
to give a lucid and coherent statement to detectives just an hour
after [the] killing," one would question whether the mother was
really suffering from a psychological delirium at the time of the
killing.232
The second circumstance is whether the defendant demon-
strated any behavior that would indicate she knew her actions were
wrong.233 For example, did she make any attempt to hide the crime
and prevent detection, or did she call 911 to report the crime?
"If a person called 911 after killing someone and said he just rid
the world of demons, he is probably ill." From my experience,
I would tend to say just the opposite-such a person is probably
a shrewd psychopath playing the only card he's got. If he was
so psychotic that he believed he rid the world of demons and
didn't know it was wrong, why would he report it to 911? If he
regained his sanity so quickly after the crime as to have full
awareness of his criminality and turn himself in to the police,
I would be doubly suspect.2
34
If an individual is truly insane and, therefore, did not know
that her actions were wrong, why would she bother to cover up the
crime, i.e. hide or dispose of the body, or call 911 to report her
crime? The individual's actions following the crime may provide
evidence of her mental state during the crime and demonstrate an
awareness of the wrongfulness of her crime.
What Happens If These Defenses Are Successful?
Because the "not guilty by reason of insanity" defendants often
are held in custody longer than defendants who are merely found
guilty of the same crime and sentenced to prison, the insanity
defense rarely is used by defense attorneys even when the defen-
dant is truly insane. 2 5  This is not the case, however, with
neonaticide defendants. Because the mothers seem to recover at
amazing speeds, the mothers often are considered sane again by the
231. See id.
232. Id.
233. See id.
234. Id. at 170-71.
235. See MARKMAN & Bosco, supra note 75, at 56.
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time of the trial and thus are never incarcerated even for purposes
of medical treatment for their alleged mental illnesses.236
So what should happen to neonaticide defendants? Barabara
Kirwin found that the recidivism rate for neonaticide is "practically
nil" and that "women who commit neonaticide do not present a
threat to society."237 There are, however, other reasons for sentenc-
ing a defendant besides deterring that particular individual from
killing again. What about being punished for the harm they have
already caused to a helpless newborn? What about the other goals
of the criminal justice system such as vindication of the victim's
rights, justice, punishment, and deterrence of others?
Michelle Oberman suggests that "most teenagers who kill
newborns, while responsible for their actions, deserve consideration
because of their youth and the psychological effects of hiding or
denying their pregnancies."23 8 Perhaps society believes these
mothers deserve lesser sentences than other murderers, but the
means for providing this leniency should not be misuse of the
insanity defense. The mothers should first be found guilty of the
crimes that they have committed, and then any possible mitigating
circumstances should be taken into consideration during the
sentencing phase only. Psychiatric examinations and testimony
should not be distorted and syndromes should not be concocted to
get the end result the defense attorneys, and perhaps society,
believes is just.
Dr. Ronald Markman discusses a case in which the defendant
was found not guilty of raping two little girls because the prosecu-
tion had produced insufficient evidence.239 The defendant could not
be tried again on the same charge, even if the prosecution was able
to acquire more evidence, because he had been tried and
acquitted.2 40 The prosecution's only chance of having the defendant
incarcerated was to have the defendant committed as mentally
ill.241 Markman was asked to testify for the prosecution at the
defendant's commitment hearing concerning the defendant's mental
condition. Even though many people, including Markman, thought
the defendant had likely committed the crimes, Markman did not
think the defendant was mentally ill and refused to testify to that
236. See KIRWIN, supra note 1, at 72.
237. Knox, supra note 177.
238. Oberman, supra note 113, at 82.
239. See MARKMAN & Bosco, supra note 75, at 68.
240. See id. at 69-71.
241. See id.
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fact at the commitment hearing. 42 He refused to testify even
though the defendant would be free to walk the streets, were he not
committed.
My responsibility within the system is to provide psychiatric
information that I can support within the boundaries of my
profession and the requirements of the law. I can only report
what I see and hear as a physician-and only within the limits
of the answers to the questions the system asks me. What the
system does with those answers is sometimes deeply disturbing.
But distorting what I know to be the medical truth is no way to
cure the system.243
If society thinks these neonaticide defendants automatically
deserve softer sentences, then the proper channel is the legisla-
tures-the criminal justice system should not be perverted to reach
a so-called "just end." "[I1f merely committing a crime brands one
as mentally ill, why do we need psychiatrists? Let the crime
determine the medical diagnosis."2"
Michelle Oberman has developed a proposal for dealing with
these neonaticide cases:
In cases involving a woman who causes the death of her
newborn infant under the age of twenty-four hours, during
which time the balance of her mind is disturbed by reason of the
effect of giving birth or of circumstances consequent upon the
birth, the alleged violation shall be presumed to be evidence of
no more than a reckless or negligent act unless disproved by
evidence to the contrary. 5
This is already the case in the American justice system. The
prosecution already has to prove each element of murder: malice,
premeditation, deliberation, and intent. 6 There is no need to make
a special guilt-determination category for these killers. The fact
finders should be allowed to do their jobs and determine if each
element is satisfied based on the facts of each case, as they do in all
other homicide cases.
Oberman goes on to point out a possible criticism of her own
proposal:
242. See id.
243. Id. (emphasis added).
244. Id.
245. Oberman, supra note 113, at 82-83.
246. See SLOVENKO, supra note 36, at 35.
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[Tihis proposal may be seen as a new effort to "medicalize"
women's responses to burdens placed upon them by virtue of
their subordinated status in society. The resort to scientific or
quasi-scientific explanations for women's criminal behavior
helps cloak the social and structural constraints on women,
forcing women to attempt to excuse their illegal actions as
crazy, rather than permitting them to reveal those actions as
rational responses to a crazy environment . 7
Since when is murdering someone who is not wanted in your life a
rational response? If the child was ten and the mother did not feel
like supporting or caring for the child anymore would it be a
rational response for her to kill that 10-year-old child? Of course
not. Neither is it rational for these neonaticide mothers to kill their
newborns simply because they are unwanted.
CONCLUSION
Why is society so quick to excuse the murders committed by
these mothers? Perhaps it is because the act seems so irrational
that it usually is assumed to be the result of a disturbed mind.
248
Just because it is hard to believe that a mother could murder her
own child does not relieve that mother from responsibility for her
crime.
Does society excuse these murders because it does not really
view the newborn as a human being? Is it that the only person who
will really miss the baby at this early point in its life is the same
person who killed it? What about the mother of a one-year-old who
shakes her baby to death to get it to stop crying? Is she insane?
No, she is a sane mother under the typical pressures of motherhood
who lost control. Society may be able to sympathize with her;
nevertheless, she should still be held accountable.
Even if others are to blame-society for attaching so much
stigma to illegitimate births, the boy for getting the girl pregnant,
the parents and teachers for not noticing the girl was pregnant-it
is still the girl who took the action and killed the baby. We must,
as individuals, stop placing the blame on others for our own actions
and realize that it is a tough world in which we live. We are each
ultimately responsible for our own actions.
247. Oberman, supra note 113, at 83-84.
248. See Mendlowicz et al., supra note 6, at 209.
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Some crimes are so horrid that we often believe that the
defendant must have been mentally ill to have committed such a
crime. "Our society is leaning awfully close to the idea that you
have to be mentally ill in some way to commit a crime. This is not
so. Most crimes-even grisly murders-are not committed by
mentally ill people, but by people just like you and me."249 Society
must come to terms with the fact that perfectly sane people are
capable of horrible crimes. We cannot allow the crime to define the
illness, but rather, we must determine whether the defendant was
not capable of determining right from wrong because of an actual
mental illness and, for that reason, should not be held responsible
for her actions.
Insanity and mental illness are conditions that must be
determined on a case-by-case basis. Deciding whether an individ-
ual is accountable should depend on that defendant's particular
circumstances and how her mental condition, if she is actually
suffering from a mental condition, affected her thinking during the
time she committed the criminal act.2 50
"Forensic psychology and psychiatry must come to terms with
evil and separate it from mental illness .... ,,251 In each case, the
defendant must be examined to determine: (1) whether the
defendant was suffering from a mental disease, and (2) whether
that mental disease affected her ability to know that her actions
were wrong or render her unable to control her actions. Society
cannot let its sympathy for the defendant's plight allow us to distort
the criminal justice system. We cannot forget that these mothers
have committed crimes, and, unless they are truly insane, they
must be held accountable for their crimes.
MEGAN C. HOGAN
249. MARKMAN & Bosco, supra note 75, at 68-69.
250. See ELLOr, supra note 42, at 2.
251. KIRWiN, supra note 1, at 87.
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